Russia's innovation reform - the current state of the special economic zones by Kari LIUHTO
Russia's Innovation Reform - The Current State 




Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, Turku, Finland
E-mail: Kari.Liuhto@tse.fi 
 
Keywords: special economic zone, innovation reform, SWOT analysis
1 Introduction
The SEZs are no novelty in Russia. The first steps in developing special 
zones were already taken in Soviet Russia at the end of the 1980's. In the 1990’s, 
some 10-20 SEZs
3 operated in Russia. These SEZs received a lot of criticism, since 
they were accused of having become legalised places for illegal business. As some 
Russian firms used the SEZs for tax evasion and bribed the SEZ administration to 
maintain their privileges, the federal authorities decided to terminate the SEZs. 
1  The author gratefully acknowledges research funding from the Paulo Foundation (Paulon Säätiö), 
the Foundation of Niilo Helander (Niilo Helanderin Säätiö), and the Academy of Finland (Grant 
118338).
2  Kari Liuhto holds a professorship in International Business and he is Director of the Pan-European 
Institute.   His   research   interests   include   EU-Russia   economic   relations,   energy   relations   in 
particular, foreign investments into Russia, and the investments of Russian firms abroad. Liuhto has 
been involved in several Russia-related projects funded by both Finnish institutions and foreign 
ones, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, the United Nations, and the 
World Bank.
3 In the 1990's, the special zones were called Free Economic Zones.
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Approximately 20 special economic zones (SEZs) have been founded in 
Russia. Four of them are innovation zones, two manufacturing zones, seven tourism 
zones, three port zones and two old zones of the 1990's, namely the Kaliningrad SEZ 
and the Magadan SEZ. Additionally, four gambling zones are to be opened by July 
2009. The Russian SEZs currently produce more plans than results i.e. unrealistic 
plans characterise the contemporary Russian SEZs. Only the Kaliningrad SEZ and the 
Magadan SEZ can be classified as fully operational, and therefore, it is far too early to 
make any firm conclusion on the economic impact of these zones on the Russian 
economy. On the other hand, it is highly recommendable that a follow-up of the 
Russian SEZs will be carried out in 3-5 years from now, since the results of today do 
not necessarily describe the potential of tomorrow.United Russia policy has further emphasized that the Russian market should 
operate under the same legislation, and thus, the privileges granted earlier to some 
regions of Russia have been taken away
4.  
In 2005-2007, Russia passed several laws related to the SEZs, and hence, 
there are six main types of SEZs: (1) innovative zones; (2) manufacturing zones; 
(3) tourism zones; (4) port zones; (5) "old zones" of the 1990's; and (6) gambling 
zones. Until the beginning of 2009, 22 SEZs have received permission from federal 
authorities   to   operate   in   Russia.   Four   of   them   are   innovation   zones,   two 
manufacturing zones, seven tourism zones, three port zones, two "old zones", and 
four gambling zones.
The innovation zones have been established in St. Petersburg, Tomsk, and 
two in Moscow, namely in Dubna and Zelenograd. The Saint Petersburg SEZ 
specialists   in   analytical   instruments,   Tomsk   in   industrial   electronics   and 
biotechnologies, Dubna in information and nuclear technologies, and Zelenograd in 
micro- and nano-electronics. 
The manufacturing zones  are located in the Lipetsk region and in the 
Republic of Tatarstan. The first concentrates mainly on domestic and industry 
appliances and the latter on automobile industry components and products of the 
chemical industry.   
The tourism zones  have been opened in Western Russia (Kaliningrad), 
Southern Russia (Krasnodar and Stavropol), and in the Asian part of Russia 
(Buryatiya, Irkutsk, Republic of Altay, and the Altay Territory). All the tourism 
zones have been placed in extremely beautiful natural locations. However, it seems 
that these zones have not been developed for mass tourism but rather for elite 
tourism. One should not be over-optimistic that foreign tourists will find these 
zones, excluding perhaps the tourism zones of Kaliningrad and Krasnodar. The 
current financial crisis may postpone the development plans of the tourism zones, 
and therefore, one should not expect any major macroeconomic results prior to the 
middle of the next decade i.e. these zones do not create any major cash inflows for 
the regional administration to solve regional problems  often caused by the 
peripheral location of these regions. 
The port zones have been established to develop logistical hubs in Russia. 
These logistics hubs can be established around sea and river ports plus airports 
(RIA 2008). These zones offer customs benefits and tax privileges to both the 
Russian and foreign companies which operate in the privileged ports. Until now, 
zones have been established in Krasnoyarsk (East Siberia), Ulyanovsk (Volga 
4  During the Yeltsin era, Russia's regions received various privileges from the federal centre. The 
Putin period practically ended the era of these regional privileges and introduced the united Russia 
policy. It is interesting to note that some regions have started to offer foreign investors certain 
advantages. One could take as an example the Kaluga region, which "offers tax cuts to investors 
based on a sliding scale of the total amount invested. Last year, new legislation also introduced 
subsidies for strategic investors, making them eligible to get back profit taxes for up to nine years. 
In addition, there are breaks on property taxes for up to four years." The region's governor aptly 
concluded in January 2009 that "we [Kaluga] have more residents in our industrial parks than 
Russia's special economic zones" (MT 2009, 1-2).      
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ultimate goal of the Russian Government is to attract private capital, including 
foreign capital with tax privileges, to aid the Russian Government to build modern 
logistics hubs in the country.
"The old zones" of the 1990's do not operate under the general legislation 
on SEZs passed in the middle of this decade, but they follow their own legislation 
passed in the 1990's. These special economic zones of the 1990's operate in 
Magadan, situated in the Far-East of Russia and in Kaliningrad, the Russian 
enclave   sandwiched   between   Lithuania   and   Poland.   Kaliningrad   has   been 
extremely successful in getting special economic zones. I assume that the success 
of Kaliningrad is based on the special location of the region rather than on any 
personalised criteria, i.e. current Prime Minister Putin's wife originates from 
Kaliningrad (Liuhto, 2007; Liuhto et al., 2007; Usanov, 2008). 
The gambling zones will be the only legal places to gamble in Russia. The 
gambling law should come into force in July 2009 allowing gambling in only four 
Russian regions, namely in Altay, Kaliningrad, Krasnodar, and in the Primorie 
District in Russia's Far East. Even if the gambling zones should commence their 
operations soon, there are considerable doubts how the law can be executed since 
the   gambling   zones   are   not   prepared   to   accommodate   gambling   activities, 
gambling companies are not ready to leave their current sites, and the Russian 
Government is unlikely to close down a business segment worth USD 8 billion 
with 500,000 employees (MT, 2008).
Special economic zones in Russia at the beginning of 2009
Table 1 
Zone Type Some focus areas Location
Saint Petersburg Innovation Analytical instruments Novo-Orlovsk and 
Neudorff, 
St. Petersburg
Tomsk Innovation Industrial electronics and 
biotechnology
Tomsk region
Dubna Innovation ICT and nuclear technology Moscow region
Zelenograd Innovation Micro- and nano-electronics Moscow region
Lipetsk Manufacturing Domestic and industry 
appliances
Lipetsk region





Altay Valley Tourism No data Republic of Altay
Biriuzovaya 
Katun
Tourism Ecological tourism, skiing Altay territory
Grand SPA  Tourism Health-related, skiing Stavropol territory
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Yutsha
New Anapa Tourism Yachts, maritime sports Krasnodar territory
Irkutsk Tourism Hunting, fishing Irkutsk region
Buryatia Tourism Ecological tourism Republic 
of Buryatia
Kurshkaya Kosa Tourism Ecological tourism, yachts Kaliningrad 
region
Yemelyanovo Port (air) Cargo hub between Asia and 
Central Russia
Krasnoyarsk
Ulyanovsk Port (air) Cargo hub, aircraft repair Volga area
Sovetskaya 
Gavan
Port (sea) Ship repair, fish processing Khabarovsk 
region
Kaliningrad "Old zone" Tax free imports-based 
assembly & large investments
Kaliningrad 
region
Magadan "Old zone" Tax free imports-based 
assembly
Magadan
Altay Gambling Russians Altay
Krasnodar Gambling Russians Azov Sea coast 
Krasnodar & 
Rostov
Kaliningrad Gambling Russians, EU citizens Baltic Sea coast, 
Kaliningrad 
region
Primorie Gambling Asian customers Primorie District
2 Special economic zones (SEZs) in Russia   
The current state of Russia's SEZs is here analyzed via a SWOT analysis. 
The first section of the chapter focuses on the innovation zones, though also 
manufacturing, tourism, port, and gambling zones are briefly dealt with. The old 
zones of the 1990's, namely Kaliningrad and Magadan, have not been included in 
the analysis conducted, since their operational reality differs from those zones 
established in the middle of this decade. 
Strengths
The legislative basis of the SEZs is sufficiently clear and the legislation is 
on a federal level, which protects the SEZ residents (companies registered within 
the SEZs) from sudden and unexpected legislative changes on a regional level. As 
a sound legal foundation was missing in the 1990's, only a few serious companies 
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terminated, which in matter of fact was what occurred. 
The SEZs offer customs advantages, tax benefits and other privileges, 
which give SEZ residents some competitive advantage. According to the Russian 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the benefits give a SEZ-based 
company a 20-30% tax advantage. Even if the benefits offered by the SEZs are 
concrete, the tax benefits alone do not make foreign firms want to invest in Russia, 
i.e. the SEZs lower the investment barrier for foreigners but the SEZ benefits alone 
are not sufficient to attract foreign firms to invest in Russia. This can easily be seen 
when one analyses the backgrounds of the SEZ residents. Leading foreign high-
tech firms have not invested in the Russian SEZs, and it is anything but certain 
whether the entry boom of global high-tech companies into Russia will happen, 
unless the SEZ administration seriously starts to attract leading foreign high-tech 
companies into the zones (stronger marketing activities required) and the general 
image of Russia as a FDI-friendly country improves. Russia's investment climate 
has seriously deteriorated since the middle of this decade as some foreign firms 
have been treated strangely by the Russian authorities and the Russian Government 
has started to restrict the operations of foreign firms in so-called strategic sectors 
(Liuhto, 2008).     
The SEZs act on the basis of the "one window" principle, which reduces 
the bureaucratic burden of investing firms. The SEZ administration can be 
extremely valuable for a foreign investor, but on the other hand, the administrative 
special service may leave room for subjectivity in the bureaucracy, i.e. enhance 
corruption. So far, no corruption cases related to new SEZs have hit the headlines. 
Though the SEZ administration should be active in attracting firms in the SEZs, 
some Finnish firms have expressed their dissatisfaction with bureaucracy and a 
lack of business-orientation in the SEZ administration (Peltola, 2008). 
Russia offers an abundant educated workforce, which is cost-competitive 
compared to the researchers in western countries. Despite the higher wage levels in 
the West, their better functioning innovation environment has still supported the 
competitiveness of innovation work in the developed countries. In addition, some 
Asian tigers, such as China and India, are far ahead of Russia in producing 
qualified experts with lower salary requests. Furthermore, the brain drain from 
Russia to the West weakens the human resource base of Russia and the SEZs can 
hardly stem the intelligence outflow from Russia in either the short or medium 
term. 
The tourism zones have been placed in extremely beautiful natural 
locations. However, the remote location of the Baikal region and the enclave 
location of Kaliningrad, continue pushing Russian tourists towards their natural 
sites i.e. the shores of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea
5, and the lakes of the 
5  The travelling and tourism account for 1.2% of the Russian GDP and 1.0% of the total employment 
i.e. in an international comparison Russia's tourism industry clearly underperforms. Besides, the 
weak quality-price ratio of the  tourism services indicates lacking competition in the field 
(Accenture 2008; Kommersant 2008). 
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destinations would have been a more rational way to build the tourism zones rather 
than to create new zones to support regional policies.  
Weaknesses
The Russian SEZs remind one more of Soviet-type "plan factories" rather 
than real activity centers, i.e. unrealistic plans are a typical characteristic for the 
Russian   SEZs.   The   macroeconomic   results,   such   as   additional   GDP   and 
employment generated, innovations and new patent-applications created, are non-
existent. In fact, only a few SEZs have begun their operations as initially planned.
The Russian SEZs do not form an integrated network but the SEZs can 
instead be regarded as isolated innovation-oriented oases in Russia's low-tech 
desert. The innovation system of Russia is stagnant, i.e. the interaction between the 
state, research institutions and universities and private companies is based on 
bureaucratic   collaboration   rather   than   on   business-driven   goals   (Dezhina   & 
Zashev, 2007; Peltola, 2008).
The R&D organisations together with the state agencies form a mammoth 
research network
6. The analysis of the Russian innovation system indicates that 
Russia does not lack innovation-related agencies, but it definitely lacks innovation-
related activity. Currently, Russia's innovation sector reminds one more of Soviet 
bureaucracy rather than a business-oriented innovation-promoting cradle. The 
European   Commission   (2007)   phrases   the   aforementioned   statement   a   bit 
differently,   i.e.   "R&D   system   structure   and   mission   as   a   whole   does   not 
correspond to the economic and social needs."
When Russia is developing its innovation-related activity,  it should be 
extremely careful what will be the role of the state in innovation building, as Russia's 
bureaucracy is notorious for its inefficiency and wide-spread corruption. In this 
context, one should remember that only 30% of the Russian R&D expenditure is 
financed by enterprises. The respective share in the EU is over 50%, in the USA 
approximately 60% and in Japan close to 75% (Dezina & Peltola, 2008). 
Russia’s national image as a low-tech country does not support the 
development of the SEZs. To illustrate the low-tech image of Russia, one could ask 
a reader to name three famous non-military-related innovations designed in Russia 
and used widely in the developed West. Not an easy task, even for an expert.
The SEZ are often located outside the city centres, which decreases the 
attractiveness of these zones in the eyes of the workforce and companies.
The marketing activities of the SEZs are weak inside Russia, and non-
existent outside the country. In fact, it is difficult to find any public information on 
these zones, even if one would be aware of their existence. The administration of 
the SEZs and the federal agency coordinating their activities should take much 
more active role in promoting these zones both inside Russia and abroad.
6  Close to 4000 R&D organisations, employing over 800,000 people, operate in Russia (Dezina & 
Peltola, 2008).
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compared to the Russian firms operating inside the SEZ. 
The earlier references by the majority of SEZ residents are unconvincing, 
and therefore,  one should not expect any rapid technological break-through in 
Russia comparable to that of China, if the SEZ administration acts as Soviet-era 
bureaucrats instead of business-oriented innovation facilitators.
As a brief conclusion on the gambling zones, one can only state that it is 
gambling to support regional policies using casinos. Casinos will find their 
Russian clientele even if they would entirely be terminated in Russia. Gambling 
will transform itself or else go underground, but it does not abandon major Russian 
cities. Gambling zones, if ultimately opened, may attract sex tourism in Russia, but 
I doubt whether that has been the original goal of the gambling zones.
The port zones should be located in natural sites, where they may one day 
survive without administrative privileges. At the moment, only the maritime port 
placed in the proximity of Japan meets this basic criterion. It is interesting to note 
that the port SEZs are absent in logical hubs, such in the regions of Kaliningrad, 
Krasnodar, Leningrad, and Murmansk. As logistics is an extremely logical sphere 
of business, supporting anything unnatural with administrative benefits will turn 
out   to   be   expensive   and   non-sustainable.   In   reverse,   supporting   something 
unnatural distorts the evolution of natural competitiveness. Furthermore, large 
infrastructure   public-private   partnerships   have   traditionally   been   extremely 
vulnerable to corruption, and therefore, the public-private partnership does not 
necessary materialize in the synergistic combination of private effectiveness and 
the state's strategic vision.  
Opportunities
The image of the SEZs has improved  among the Russian workforce, 
companies and particularly among the Russian decision-makers, i.e. the SEZs are 
no longer regarded as special zones created for money laundering and corruption. 
However, it will take plenty of time before the Russian SEZs become known 
among foreign business circles (Giannella & Tompson 2007).
The SEZs may become an additional tool in strengthening regional 
centres, but this would require that the development speed should be accelerated 
tremendously. At the moment, the SEZ suffer from a common virus in Russia, i.e. 
a good idea at the federal level does not materialize in efficient implementation at 
the regional level. The SEZ administration, with a few exceptions, has seldom 
enough experience on assessing the development of global demand on high-tech 
goods, the competition involved, and make future visions needed for supporting 
innovation building. If the regional administration is not fully aware of the global 
demand and competition, it hardly can create the conditions needed for attracting 
globally–recognised   innovators   into   Russia.  I   doubt   that   the   administrative
 top-down innovation policy can create any major innovation revolution in Russia, 
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start to invest more in R&D.   
The collaboration between the SEZs and the state-funded technology 
centres, regional industrial/innovation parks, and universities is much  below 
potential.  A National Innovation System (NIS) can be a step towards a right 
direction, as long as the state minimises its own role, since less bureaucracy means 
more results.  The integration of the activities of the Russian Nanotechnology 
Corporation with some SEZs might give some boost to creating a high-tech 
network in Russia. The experience and outstanding leadership skills of the 
corporation's director general, Anatoly Chubais, are without a doubt major assets 
for the future development of Russian nanotechnology.
Closer collaboration with the world’s leading high-tech countries and the 
global R&D corporations would benefit the SEZs. 
Threats
Most of the SEZs are to be closed in the mid-2020's, or even earlier, if 
Russia decides to cancel the SEZ laws due to the weak performance of the zones. 
The fixed tenure reduces the attraction to invest in the zones since the tenure of the 
privileged period becomes shorter day by day. 
Even if Russia’s accession to the WTO has progressed very slowly, 
Russia’s possible membership in the WTO might force Russia to close the SEZs, 
and compensate losses to the SEZ residents. The compensation from the Russian 
Government does not necessarily cover all the costs incurred by a SEZ resident. In 
this context, one should stress that Russia's WTO membership is everything but 
certain. 
The role of the military-industrial complex in innovation building distracts 
both the Russian private companies and foreign firms
7. There is a substantial risk 
that some innovation-related industries become restricted, and therefore, natural 
competition   weakens.   As   the   competition   forces   organisations   to   innovate, 
restricted innovation sectors could be damaging for Russia’s goal to diversify its 
economy. The military-led innovation system would mean that competition would 
be replaced with control and secrecy. If the most advanced parts of the Russian 
innovation sector will become restricted or closed, it will push foreign innovation-
related companies to invest in some Asian countries, where they will find experts 
with lower salaries (Liuhto, 2008). 
The Russian SEZs should not neglect foreign investments for at least six 
reasons. First, foreign firms bring additional R&D capital into Russia
8. Second, 
foreign firms bring advanced technology and introduce best practices, which are 
even more important than the finance per se, since money can buy the technology 
7   The development plan 2020 approved by the Russian Government in the beginning of 2009 
confirms that Russia has not abandoned the old pattern i.e. the use of the military-industrial 
complex in its high-tech projects and technological modernisation (e.g. BOFIT, 2009). 
8  At the moment, foreign firms form nearly 10% of all R&D expenditure in Russia (Peltola 2008).
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R&D companies, the Russian innovation network will focus on domestic needs 
instead   of   the   global   opportunities.   Fourth,   the   foreign   firms   accelerate 
competition, i.e. they bring dynamism into Russia's stagnant innovation sector. 
Fifth, the leading foreign innovators have a better view of future innovation 
development   than   even   best-informed   bureaucrats.   Sixth,   foreign   high-tech 
companies' investment in Russia is a more cost-efficient way to diversify Russia 
from a raw material producer towards a high-tech country than the acquisition of 
foreign high-tech companies and bringing their knowledge to Russia. 
I recommend that the Russian SEZs would focus on inviting a couple of 
leading foreign innovators in the zones. Foreign innovation leaders would bring 
their own foreign clients into the zones, as internationalisation often occurs via 
business   networks   (follow-your-client   strategy).   Since   foreign   innovation 
companies cannot act by themselves in Russia, the subcontracting agreements 
would be a natural way for Russian firms to join the global innovation networks 
without going abroad. Although the aforementioned recipe sounds easy, one should 
not assume that the SEZs alone would be a sufficient attraction to bring foreign 
innovators into Russia. Therefore, Russia should improve its investment climate 
and upgrade its innovation system to be able to succeed in a high-tech revolution. 
The current financial crisis slows down the development of the SEZs, since 
the regions and the companies have to focus on securing their core operations 
instead of developing innovations.
As   the   new   law   on   SEZs   was   passed   relatively   recently,   it   is 
understandable that the results of new SEZs are very modest. In other words, the 
results of today do fully describe the potential of tomorrow, and therefore, it is 
highly advisable that the follow-up of the SEZ analysis would be conducted in 
three-five years from now.
3 Conclusion
One could conclude the progress of the Russian SEZs with a proverb 
"Much ado about nothing". At the moment, the Russian SEZs still offer very little 
for foreign firms. Even if the SEZs offer certain financial privileges and the 
Russian researchers are generally very qualified, Russia's poor reputation on 
immaterial rights, weak innovation system, the low-tech image of the country, a 
lack of R&D-related finance, and administrative inertia downplay the advantages 
offered by the zones. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to note that foreign firms are a rarity in the 
zones. In fact, only a few domestic companies have been founded in the Russian 
zones, since the majority of the zones have not started their operations as initially 
planned. 
If the Russian SEZs do not produce any tangible macroeconomic results by 
the middle of the next decade, their existence can be questioned, since already by 
2025 many of the SEZs are to be terminated. 
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the implementation of a follow-up study on the Russian SEZs and innovation-
related activities in 3-5 years from now.
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